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To date EU anti-discrimination legislation, particularly the Employment Equality Directive 
(Directive 2000/78/EC), does not provide any clear definition of disability as a ground of 
discrimination. In the last few years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
attempted to fill this gap and discussed the concept of disability in several decisions, in the 
attempt to provide a definition of the ground of disability. The ratification by the European 
Union of the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), has led to a 
clear overruling in the case law: the Court shifted from the medical model to the social model 
of disability. The UNCRPD now represents a milestone for the CJEU, which recognised that 
a duty arises to define disability in line with the social model, under the principle of 
consistent interpretation. Against this background, this article discusses CJEU case law, and 
compares and contrasts the judicial activism of the Court with the cautious approach 
adopted by the European Commission in the proposal for a new non-discrimination directive.  
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In western culture
1
 disability was traditionally viewed as an individual, medical problem or 
even a ‘personal tragedy’.2 Until approximately the 1980s, disability was conceived as an 
individual deficit deriving from ‘a disease, trauma or health condition that impairs or disrupts 
physiological or cognitive functioning’3. This ‘medical model’ focused on the actual health 
condition of the particular person and on the treatments that could be provided to ‘repair’ or 
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1
 Further to the distinction between the concept of disability in western and developing countries see, among 
others, Elia Mira Bernabeu, ‘The Social Model Analysis of Disability and the Majority World’ (2012) 6 
Intersticios. Revista Sociològica de Pensamiento Crìtico 2, 279. 
2
 Among others, Colin Barnes, ‘The Social Model of Disability: Valuable or Irrelevant?’ in Nick Watson, Alan 
Roulstone, and Carol Thomas (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Disability Studies (Routledge 2012). 
3
 Charles E. Drum, ‘Models and Approaches to Disability’, in Charles E. Drum., Gloria Krahn, Hank Jr. 
Bersani, Disability and Public Health (American Public Health Association/American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 2009). 
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alleviate the impairment. It conceptualized disability as a negative condition, and identified 
disability with an individual impairment completely independent from any other external or 
environmental element. 
A new sensitivity towards disability issues gradually arose after World War II. As a 
reaction against this medicalized vision (i.e. the ‘medical model of disability’),4 beginning 
from the late 1960s, scholars and disability activists
5
 elaborated the ‘social model of 
disability’, which conceived disability as a societal creation.6 While the ‘medical model’ 
focused on the actual health condition of the particular person and on the treatments that 
could be provided to ‘repair’ or alleviate the impairment, in the social model, disability is 
viewed as the consequence of environmental barriers.
7
  Hence, whereas the impairment is the 
functional limitation within the individual, disability is conceived as ‘the loss or limitation of 
opportunities to take part in the normal life of the community on an equal level with others 
due to physical and social barriers’.8 The theoretical reflection on the social model is still 
evolving. On the one hand, different theorisations of the social model itself have been 
developed.
9
 On the other hand, this model has been the subject of scholarly criticism.
10
 
Despite a growing criticism, the ‘social model’ appears to be the dominant paradigm in 
understanding disability,
11
 and has inspired the disability agenda at the international and 
European levels for the last 30 years. In particular, in the European Union (EU), the 
development of a wide European disability policy has corresponded to a clear shift from a 
medical model approach to disability to a holistic social one.
12
  
                                                          
4
 Colin Barnes, ‘The Social Model of Disability: Valuable or Irrelevant?’ (n 2). 
5
 At first, academic interest in disability issues arose during the Seventies in UK and in USA. In particular, the 
UK’s first ‘disability’ studies course was taught at the Open University (OU) in 1975 as an optional module on 
the OU’s Health and Social Studies Degree. In USA Disability Studies was pioneered by disability advocates 
and academics in the area of medical sociology. Colin Barnes, ‘The Social Model of Disability: Valuable or 
Irrelevant?’ (n 2). 
6
 This novel conceptualization of disability was first put forward by the Union of the Physically Impaired 
Against Segregation (UPIAS) in 1976, but the term ‘social model’ was initially used by Mike Oliver in his 
seminal contribution to the volume Jo Campling, The Handicapped Person: A New Perspective for Social 
Workers? (RADAR 1981). 
7
 Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer, Exploring Disability (2
nd
 edn, Polity Press, 2010); A. Llewellyn and K. Hogan 
‘The Use and Abuse of Models of Disability’, (2000) Disability & Society, 15, 157; Peter Siminski, ‘Patterns of 
disability and norms of participation through the life course: empirical support for a social model of disability’, 
(2003) 18 Disability & Society, 707. Mike Oliver ad Colin Barnes, ‘Disability studies, disabled people and the 
struggle for inclusion’, (2010) 31 British Journal of Sociology of Education 5, 547. 
8
 Colin Barnes, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination (Hurst and Co. 1991). 
9
 There are several ‘social models’ of disability that are variants of the primary social model: the legal rights 
model, the minority group model and the affirmation model of disability. There are also a number of models of 
disability that take elements of the medical and the social models and integrate them: two significant examples 
are the ‘Nagi model’ and the ‘bio-psycho-social model’ of disability. For an analysis of the different approaches 
mentioned, see, among others, Drum, supra note 3. On the affirmation model see John Swain & Sally French 
‘Towards an Affirmation Model of Disability’, (2000) Disability & Society, 569. For different theorization of 
the social models, see also, among many others, Angharad E. Becketta & Tom Campbell, ‘The social model of 
disability as an oppositional device’, (2015) 30 Disability & Society, 270. 
10
 Inter alia: Dimitris Anastasiou and James M. Kaufmann, ‘The Social Model of Disability: Dichotomy 
between Impairment and Disability’, (2013) 38 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 441; Guy Dewsbury, Klare 
Clarke, Dave Randall, Mark Rouncefield and Ian Sommerville, ‘The Anti‐Social Model of Disability’(2004) 19 
Disability & Society 2, 145. 
11
 Maxime Vanderstraeten, ‘Définir, c’est exclure: le cas du handicap’ (2015) Revue interdisciplinaire d'études 
juridiques’, 91, at 94. 
12
 Vlad Perjul, ‘Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the European Union 
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Despite the embracement of the social model, which is evident in the cornerstone 
document of EU disability policy, i.e. the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 (the ‘EDS 
2010-2020’ or simply the ‘Strategy’),13 EU legislation, to date, does not include a unique 
prescriptive definition of disability. In State aid law, namely in the 2014 General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER),
14
 a definition of ‘workers with disabilities’ has been 
included. However, while this definition is clearly inspired to the social model, it still refers 
to national legislation in a vain attempt to respect the diversity of legal cultures and 
approaches to disability across the Member States.
15
 Disability-related provisions in other 
areas of EU legislation, such as transport,
16
 lifts,
17
 public procurement,
18
 and electronic 
communications networks and services
19
 do not purport to offer a definition of what 
constitutes a disability. The uneasy task to identify the criteria for determining disability has 
been deliberately left to national legislation, clearly resulted in a sort of patchwork. A study, 
released in 2002, reviewed the definitions of disability adopted across the EU juxtaposing 
different national disability provisions in different areas, such as social security, employment 
and anti-discrimination. It revealed that there are not only several definitions, which differ 
from a Member States to another, but often national laws include diverse assessments of 
disability in different areas of action.
20
  Few States, for example Ireland, have adopted a very 
wide definition of disability.
21
 Other Member States, such as Italy,
22
 have adopted a more 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and the United States’, (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal, 279. 
13
 European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, COM(2010) 
636 final. 
14
 Commission Regulation (EU) 51/2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market 
in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty [2014] OJ  L 187/1. 
15
 According to Art. 2 of the GBER a worker with disabilities is ‘any person who: (a) is recognised as worker 
with disabilities under national law; or (b) has long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment(s) 
which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in a work 
environment on an equal basis with other workers’. 
16
 See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No. 1899/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3922/91 on the harmonization of technical requirements and 
administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation [2006] OJ L 377/1; Directive 2006/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 laying down technical requirements for inland 
waterway vessels and repealing Council Directive 82/714/ EEC [2006] OJ L 389/1; Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 8/2008 of 11 December 2007 amending Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3922/91 as regards common 
technical requirements and administrative procedures applicable to commercial transportation by airplane 
[2008] OJ L 10/1; Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 
2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No. 
1191/69 and 1107/70 [2007] OJ L 315/1; Regulation (EC) No. 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations [2007] OJ L 315/14; Regulation (EC) No. 
1107/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 concerning the rights of disabled 
persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air [2006] OJ L 204/1. 
17
 Directive 95/16/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to lifts [1995] OJ L 213/1. 
18
 Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ L 134/1; Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures 
for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L 
134/114. 
19
 Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks 
and services (Universal Service Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/51. 
20
 Deborah Mabbett, ‘Definitions of Disability in Europe. A Comparative Analysis’, Final Report 13 December 
2002, a study prepared by Brunel University, UK (European Commission). 
21
 Article 2(1) Disability Act 2005 available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2005/en/act/pub/0014/ accessed 
28 May 2015. See also the definition of disability in the Employment Equality Act 1998 available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1998/en/act/pub/0021/ accessed 28 May 2015. 
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restrictive definition. In some cases, Member States still keep medical model oriented-
definitions of disability, such as Germany.
23
 Vanderstraeten recalls that also in Belgium 
different definitions of disability (handicap) coexist, but most of them are informed to the 
medical model.
 24
 
In the non-discrimination field, the absence of a definition of disability as a ground of 
discrimination has proven particularly problematic. This is so because a uniform definition of 
disability across the EU is of paramount importance in determining the actual scope ratione 
personae of Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation (hereafter ‘Employment Equality 
Directive’).25 While it is arguable that few serious problems arise from the understanding of 
traditional grounds of discrimination, such as nationality, the absence of a definition of 
disability creates uncertainty as regards the scope of the protection afforded in the EU legal 
order. As most recently noted by Lane and Munkholn, disparities in the extent to which anti-
discrimination laws implementing the Employment Equality Directive have been applied are 
due also to differences in understanding ‘the very concept of disability’.26 The Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been called upon to fill the lacuna in EU anti-
discrimination legislation, and has attempted several times to interpret the meaning of 
‘disability’ for the purpose of the Directive. CJEU’s case law has been largely boosted by the 
EU accession to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (UNCRPD or 
simply ‘the Convention’),27 which has become a clear point of reference in the reasoning of 
the European judges.  
Against this background, this article aims to contribute to the current debate by 
examining which definition of disability has emerged within EU non-discrimination law, and 
whether the reference to the social model is sufficient to ensure legal certainty and uniform 
legal protection against discrimination across the EU. It also aims to discuss whether a 
legislative definition would be desirable, comparing and contrasting the ‘judicial activism’ of 
the Court with a certain ‘restraint’ of the EU legislature.  
This article begins with a succinct analysis of the conceptualization of disability in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
22
 In Italian legislation, the terms disability and handicap are used as synonymous, creating confusion. From the 
definition of handicapped person provided by Article 3 of l. 104/1992, we can deduce a definition of disability. 
This provision defines the handicapped person as a person who has a physical, mental or sensory impairment, 
which can be stable or progressive and which produces learning difficulties, relationship problems or obstacles 
in work integration and which could determine social disadvantage or marginalization. This definition is 
underpinned by the medical model, because focuses only on the individual impairments and does not take into 
account the environmental barriers.  
23
 Theresia Degener, ‘The Definition of Disability in German and Foreign Discrimination law’ (2006) 26 
Disability Studies Quarterly, 2. For a general discussion on the definition of disability adopted at the national 
level see also Lisa Waddington and Anna Lawson, Disability and non-discrimination law in the European 
Union: An analysis of disability discrimination law within and beyond the employment field (European Network 
of Legal experts in the Non-discrimination Field), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 
2009, available at:  http://www.ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6154&langId=en.  
24
 Maxime Vanderstraeten, ‘Définir, c’est exclure: le cas du handicap’ (2015) Revue interdisciplinaire d'études 
juridiques’, 91, at 98.  
25
 [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
26
 Jakie Lane & Natalie Videbaek Munkholm, ‘Danish and British Protection from Disability Discrimination at 
Work – Past, Present and Future’ (2015) The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 91. 
27
 Council Decision 2010/48/EC [2010] OJ L 23/35.  
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most relevant sources of international law, in particular the UNCRPD, since these documents 
have represented a clear point of reference for CJEU (Section 2). It then briefly sketches out 
the evolution of EU disability policy in a chronological fashion, in order to give the reader 
the necessary background to the analysis carried out (Section 3). Sections 4 focuses on the 
Court’s relevant judgments, critically examining the ‘judicial activism’ of the Court. Section 
5 compares and contrast this judicial activism with the timid attitude shown by other EU 
institutions in the ongoing legislative procedure concerning the proposal for a new non-
discrimination directive.
28
 Section 6 draws together the discussion in the previous sections. 
 
 
2. TRANSLATING THE SOCIAL MODEL INTO INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM THE INTERNATIONAL 
CLASSIFICATION OF FUNCTIONING, DISABILITY AND HEALTH (ICF) TO THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
 
The social model of disability has inspired the disability agenda at the international level in 
the last twenty years. In particular, the influence of the social model theory is visible in both 
the World Health Organization’s and United Nations’ documents which have served as point 
of reference to EU to develop a European disability policy
29
 and, most recently, to the CJEU 
in its case law. The embracement of the social model marked a shift from a mere welfare 
perspective to a new human rights approach, and led to the abandonment of paternalistic and 
merely rehabilitative perspectives.
30
 It also shaped a definition that focuses on societal 
barriers rather than on the impairment of the person. 
In the early 1980s, the social model timidly influenced the International Classification 
of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps (ICIDH) of 1981, even though, in that document, 
a subtle ambiguity of language
31
 and medical elements remained. The criticism raised against 
the ICIDH led the World Health Organisation to elaborate a new classification in 2001, the 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF).
32
 The ICF fully 
recognizes the role of both environmental factors and health conditions in the 
conceptualization of disability. It is explicitly based on the ‘bio-psycho-social’ model of 
                                                          
28
 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, COM (2008) 426 def. 
29
 Gerard Quinn and Eilionoir Flynn, ‘Transatlantic Borrowings: The Past and Future of EU Non Discrimination 
Law and Policy on the Ground of Disability’ (2012) 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 23. 
30
 Vlad Perjul, ‘Impairment, Discrimination, and the Legal Construction of Disability in the European Union 
and the United States’, (n 12). 
31
 Jerome E. Bickenbach, Somnath Chatterji, E.M Badley, T.B Üstün, ‘Models of Disablement, Universalism 
and the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps’ (1999) 48 Social Science & 
Medicine, 1175. 
32
 Adopted by the World Health Organisation 54th World Health Assembly, Resolution A54/18 on 9 April 
2001. The World Health Organization has elaborated a series of international classifications on health (the so 
called WHO Family of International Classifications) with the purpose to provide a consensual framework and a 
common language for governments, providers and consumers in the field. Among these classifications, the 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) establishes a standard language and 
conceptual basis for the definition and measurement of disability. For further information see World Health 
Organisation, ICIDH 2. International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps, (Final Draft, 
2001 WHO). See also T.B Üstün, Somnath Chatterji, Jerome E. Bickenbach, M. Kostanjsek, M. Schneider, ‘The 
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health: a New Tool for Understanding Disability and 
Health’ (2003) 25 Disability and Rehabilitation, 565. 
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disability, which attempts to combine some elements of the medical model with the idea of 
disability as a societal construction. As highlighted by Barnes and Mercer,
33
 the ICF 
‘acknowledges that participation is the outcome of the inter-relationship between the 
‘features of the person’ and ‘social and physical environments’. Definitions and categories in 
the ICF are worded in neutral language: disability and functioning are understood as 
‘umbrella terms’, without any explicit or implicit distinction between different health 
conditions. In other words, disability is not differentiated by aetiology. As a consequence, by 
shifting the focus from health condition to functioning, the ICF places all health conditions 
on an equal footing, allowing them to be compared, in terms of their related functioning, via a 
common framework. Notably, even though ‘the ICF ties in with social model thinking, and it 
recognises the cultural influences on perceptions of disability, its classification system 
remains firmly grounded in western scientific concepts’. 34 
At the UN level, the first (non-binding) document which focused on the societal 
barriers was the 1993 United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for 
Persons with Disabilities (1993 UN Standard Rules).
35
 Being clearly aimed at the 
‘equalization of opportunities’, the 1993 Standard Rules at first sight, reflected the ‘rebellion’ 
against ‘the medical and diagnostic approach, which ignored the imperfections and 
deficiencies of the surrounding society’.36 However, on closer inspection, the terminology 
used by the rules is still somewhat ’mixed’. On the one hand, the term ‘disability’ is 
connected to ‘different functional limitations occurring in any population in any country of 
the world’. According to the rules ‘[p]eople may be disabled by physical, intellectual or 
sensory impairment, medical conditions or mental illness. Such impairments, conditions or 
illnesses may be permanent or transitory in nature’. On the other hand, the rules refer to 
‘handicap’ as ‘the loss or limitation of opportunities to take part in the life of the community 
on an equal level with others’, i.e. ‘the encounter between the person with a disability and the 
environment’, reflecting thus the ‘social model’. 
The first legally binding instrument fully embracing the ‘social model’ of disability, i.e. 
the view that disability stems primarily from the failure of the social environment to meet the 
needs of people with disabilities, is the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (UNCRPD), adopted in 2006 by the UN General Assembly and which entered 
into force in 2008.
37
  It is widely recognized that the UNCRPD has been the most rapidly 
negotiated UN treaty, and one of the most ground-breaking pieces of legislation in the field of 
human rights. Even though the Convention does not seek to create new rights for disabled 
                                                          
33
 Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer, ‘Theorising and Researching Disability from a Social Model Perspective’ in 
Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer (eds), Implementing the Social Model of Disability: Theory and Research (The 
Disability Press 2004). 
34
 Ibid.  
35
 General Assembly n. 48/96 of 20 December 1993 
36
 See at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dissre01.htm#concepts accessed 25 May 2015. 
37
 The UNCRPD text, along with its drafting history, resolutions, and updated list of signatories and States 
Parties, is available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/. On the Convention, see Aart Hendricks, ‘UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2007) 14 EJHL, 273; Francesco Seatzu, ‘La Convenzione delle 
Nazioni Unite sui Diritti delle Persone Disabili: i Principi Fondamentali’, (2008) 3 Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, 535; Sergio Marchisio,Valentina Della Fina, Rachele Cera, La Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite 
sui Diritti delle Persone con Disabilita: Commentario (Aracne 2010) XIII. 
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persons, it elaborates and clarifies existing human rights within the disability context.
38
 In 
other words, it aims at ensuring the active participation of persons with disabilities in 
political, economic, social, and cultural life, by accommodating their difference, and ‘seeks to 
recast disability as a social construction and articulates protections in specific application to 
their human rights enjoyment’.39 Even though the UNCRPD firmly embraces the social 
model, it does not include a proper definition of disability.
40
  
During the negotiations, there was considerable disagreement on whether or not to 
include a definition of disability in the text of the Convention. Some negotiators suggested 
not including a precise definition, but instead prioritizing flexibility, adaptation to change and 
the inclusiveness of the concept. For instance, the European Commission, negotiating on 
behalf of the EU, argued that the approach used by the EU in its internal disability 
discrimination legislation, namely the Employment Equality Directive, which does not 
contain any definition, was to be preferred. Many suggested that a definition of disability 
would become outdated and would risk leaving groups outside the Convention’s scope. 
Conversely others, especially disabled people organizations and NGOs, considered it 
necessary to include a strict definition in order to prevent States from evading real 
commitments.
41
  They argued that, in the absence of a definition, national definitions would 
prevail, preventing a uniform implementation of the UNCRPD.
42
 In the Working Group’s 
draft
43
 it was agreed that, if included, a definition of disability should have reflected the 
social model.  
As a result of a fierce debate, the final text provides a sort of open-ended 
conceptualization of disability in the Preamble and in Article 1 UNCRPD, whilst Article 2, 
devoted to definitions, does not mention disability, nor people with disabilities. Namely, the 
Preamble, at Paragraph e), affirms that ‘[d]isability is an evolving concept and that disability 
results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and 
environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal 
                                                          
38
 See, among others, Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: towards a Holistic Concept of Rights’ 
(2008) The International Journal of Human Rights, 261; Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Human 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 2, 494.  
39
 Michael A. Stein and Janet E. Lord, ‘Future Prospects for the United Nations Convention on Disability’, in 
Gerard Quinn and  Oddný Mjöll Arnardottir (eds), The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Brill 2009).  
40
 Further to a detailed analysis of the drafting history of the UNCRPD, see, among others, Rosemary Kayness, 
Philip French, ‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 
Human Rights Law Review, 1; Stefan Trömel, ‘A Personal Perspective on the Drafting History of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2009) European Yearbook on Disability Law, 
115; Gerard Quinn, ‘A Short Guide to the United Nations Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities’ 
(2009) 1 European Yearbook of Disability Law, 89; Grainne De Burca, ‘The EU in the Negotiation of 
the UN Disability Convention’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 2, Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 1525611, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525611. 
41
 All the detailed documentation referred to the discussion on the opportunity to insert a definition of disability 
in the UNCRPD is available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata2bkgrnd.htm accessed 28 
May 2015. 
42
 The discussions on the topic took place in particular during the Third (24 May – 4 June 2004), Fourth (23 
August – 3 September 2004) and Seventh (16 January – 3 February 2006) Sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee 
on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, established by the General Assembly resolution 56/168 of 19 December 
2001, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcstata2bkgrnd.htm accessed 28 May 2015. 
43
 http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcwgreportax1.htm accessed 28 May 2015. 
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basis with others’. 
Article 1 UNCRPD on the ‘purpose’ of the Convention states: ‘[p]ersons with 
disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others’. Article 1 is clearly informed by the 
social model and plays a key role in the protection of persons with disabilities: it is not strictu 
sensu a prescriptive definition, but only provides a minimum ground of protection to be 
fulfilled by the Parties to the Convention. The UNCRPD does not delineate disability any 
further, and does not engage in any distinction among different categories or ‘diagnostic 
labelling’.44 
 
 
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EU ‘SOCIAL MODEL ORIENTED’ DISABILITY POLICY  
 
3.1. THE EARLY EU DISABILITY LAW AND POLICY 
 
As highlighted above, in the last thirty years the European Union (EU) has developed a 
significant body of disability law and policy, which has been progressively informed by the 
social model, under the influence of international law. The earliest actions date back to the 
1970s, and were mainly aimed at sustaining Member States in providing specific ‘income and 
services apart from the institutions that serv[ed] the non-disabled majority’.45 These 
initiatives were primarily non-binding (soft law), or took the form of action programmes to 
enhance the exchange of information, and were confined to the areas of employment and 
vocational training.
46
 In the 1980s, under the influence of the United Nations (UN) disability 
policy
47
 the European agenda gradually started to extend beyond its initial narrow scope.
48
 In 
this period, however, as suggested by Kelemen and Vanhala, the EU action was still linked to 
a medical conception of disability and more focused on stimulating a policy debate, rather 
                                                          
44
 Despite this solution for example US, that are in the process of discussing a future ratification of the 
Convention, intend to include a declaration: “a definition of disability understanding, which states that 
UNCRPD does not define ‘disability’ or ‘persons with disabilities’, and that the United States understands the 
definitions of these terms to be consistent with U.S. law. Available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42749.pdf.  
45
 Lisa Waddington and Matthew Diller, ‘Tensions and Coherence in Disability Policy: The Uneasy 
Relationship between Social Welfare and Civil Rights Models of Disability in American, European and 
International Employment Law’, in Mary Lou Breslin and Silvia Yee (eds), Disability Rights Law and Policy 
(Transnational Publishers, 2002). 
46
 Initial Community Action Programme for the Vocational Rehabilitation of Handicapped Persons (1974-1979), 
Council Resolution of 24 July 1974 [1974] OJ C 80/30; First Community Action programme on the Social 
Integration of Handicapped People (1983-1988), 21 December 1981 [1981] OJ C 347/1; HELIOS I Community 
Action Programme for Disabled People (1988-1991), 23 April 1988 [1988] OJ L 104/38; HELIOS II 
Community Action Programme to assist Disabled People (1993-1996), Council Decision 93/136/EEC of 25 
February 1993 [1993] OJ  L 56/30.   
47
 Inter alia Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons n. 3447 of 9 December 1975, and the International 
Year of Disabled Persons (1981), General Assembly resolution n. 31/123 of 16 December 1976. 
48
 The ‘1986 Recommendation on the Employment of Disabled People’ in the European Community 
(86/379/EEC) was based on the principle of ‘fair opportunities’ for people with disabilities within the labour 
market, to be achieved via non-discrimination measures. 
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than on laying down concrete actions.
49
 The UN Standard Rules, which, as mentioned above,  
contextualize, for the first time, disability within the frame of human rights,
50
 boosted the EU 
action and deeply inspired the ‘1996 European Community Disability Strategy’ (1996 
Strategy).
51
 The 1996 Strategy laid down the policy foundations for intertwined actions 
aimed at mainstreaming disability into all policy formation. However, in practice, the EU’s 
role was still confined to support co-operation among Member States, through the 
identification and exchange of good practices.
52
 The 1996 Strategy was clearly inspired by 
the social model and referred to human diversity and equality of opportunities, yet avoided 
any explicit definition of disability. 
The major quantitative and qualitative change in EU disability policy dates back to 
1999 with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, which conferred on the EU (i.e. to 
the former European Community) a sound competence to combat disability discrimination.
53
 
It also included a Declaration stating that Union institutions must take account of the needs of 
persons with disabilities in drawing up measures under former Article 95 EC (nowArt. 114 
TFEU).  
Further to the constitutional changes that occurred, Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation (hereafter ‘Employment Equality Directive’)54 marked the first legislative 
intervention to address discrimination on the ground of disability. There is a huge amount of 
literature on the Employment Equality Directive
55
 and several of the CJEU’s decisions have 
shaped the meaning and the scope of its provisions. For the purpose of this analysis, it 
suffices to point out that this directive bans both direct discrimination (differential treatment 
based on a specific characteristic) and indirect discrimination (any provision, criterion or 
practice which is apparently neutral, but is liable to adversely affect one or more specific 
individuals or incite discrimination). Settled CJEU case law states that the principle of non-
discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently, that 
dissimilar situations must not be treated in the same way, and a different treatment may be 
justified if it is based on objective considerations and is proportionate to the legitimate 
objective being pursued.
56
 Harassment, which creates a hostile environment, is also deemed 
to be a form of discrimination. Notably, the Employment Equality Directive imposes only 
minimum requirements, and allows Member States to apply provisions which are more 
favourable to the protection of equal treatment, than those laid down in the Directive.  
                                                          
49
 R. Daniel Kelemen and Lisa Vanhala, ‘The Shift to the Rights Model of Disability in the EU and Canada’ 
(2010) Regional & Federal Studies 1, 1. 
50
 See supra Section 2. 
51
 Gerard Quinn and Eilionoir Flynn, ‘Transatlantic Borrowings: The Past and Future of EU Non Discrimination 
Law and Policy on the Ground of Disability’ (2012) 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 23. 
52
 Mark Priestley, ‘In search of European Disability Policy: Between National and Global’ (2007) 1 ALTER – 
Revue Européenne de recherche sur l’handicap, 61: Lisa Waddington, From Rome to Nice in a Wheelchair. The 
Development of a European Disability Policy (Europa Law Publishing 2006). 
53
 Article 13 EC Treaty now Art. 19 TFEU. 
54
 [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
55
 Among many others see Erica Howard, ‘EU Equality Law: Three Recent Developments’, (2011) 17 European 
Law Journal 785; Evelyn Ellis and Philippa Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 
2012. Erica Howard (2011) 17, ‘ECJ Advances Equality in Europe by Giving Horizontal Direct Effect to 
Directives’, European Public Law, 4, 729. 
56
 Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Etat Belge [2003] ECR I-11613. 
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The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU CFR), solemnly 
proclaimed in 2000, helped shed a new light on the rights of people with disabilities. In fact, 
the Charter contains different provisions directly or indirectly related to disability. Article 20 
of the Charter provides for equality before the law, Article 21(1) provides for an all-
embracing prohibition on discrimination, and Article 26 of the Charter states that ‘[t]he 
Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures 
designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation 
in the life of the community’.57  
In 2003 the EU Disability Action Plan 2003-2010 (hereinafter EU DAP) was adopted to 
carry forward the 1996 Strategy.
58
 The ultimate objective of the EU DAP was to ‘boost equal 
opportunities for people with disabilities’ so as to create a ‘sustainable dynamic for the full 
inclusion of people with disabilities into society’. The EU DAP was clearly informed by the 
social model and was aimed at mainstreaming disability issues across all EU policies, 
legislation and programmes from design and implementation through to monitoring and 
evaluation.
59
  
 
3.2. CURRENT EU DISABILITY LAW AND POLICY IN A NUTSHELL 
 
After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 19 TFEU (former Art. 13 EC) 
remains the main relevant provision which confers legislative competence on the EU in 
relation to combating discrimination on disability (and other) grounds. In addition, Article 10 
TFEU requires that, ‘in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall 
aim to combat discrimination based on … disability …’. Other provisions of the TFEU 
conferring legislative competence on the EU in relation to other matters, do not explicitly 
mention disability discrimination. It is well known that, even though the EU CFR has been 
given the same legal value as the Treaties (Article 6 TEU), the Charter does not expand 
existing EU competencies.  
To date, the Employment Equality Directive remains the main piece of legislation that 
protects and promotes the rights of people with disabilities, even though the EU legal 
framework currently includes disability-related provisions in various areas, such as transport, 
                                                          
57
 Valentina Bongiovanni, ‘La Tutela dei Disabili tra Carta di Nizza e Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite’ (2011) 
3 Famiglia e Diritto, 310, also available online at http://www.iusme.it/contributi/04%20-
%20Veronica%20Bongiovanni.pdf; Marco Olivetti, ‘Uguaglianza. Art. 26 Inserimento dei disabili’, in Raffaele 
Bifulco, Marta Cartabia, Alfonso Celotto, L’Europa dei Diritti. Commentario alla Carta dei Diritti 
Fondamentali dell’Unione Europea (Il Mulino, 2001); Carlo Hanau, ‘Handicap’, Dig. Disc. Pubbl. VIII (Utet, 
2003) 67. 
58
 Commission Communication COM(2003) 650 of 30.10.2003 ‘Equal opportunities for people with disabilities: 
A European Action Plan’.  
59
 See also CSES, Mid-term Evaluation of the European Action Plan 2003-2010 on Equal Opportunities for 
People with Disabilities, Final Report, June 2009, at file:///C:/Users/sfavalli/Downloads/Final%20report%20-
%20MTE%20of%20EU%20DAP%20PDF.pdf  
accessed 28 May 2015. The Mid-term Evaluation of the European Disability Action Plan 2003-2010 was carried 
out by the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services (CSES) on behalf of the Unit for the Integration of 
People with Disabilities (Unit G3) of the Directorate-General Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities (DG EMPL) during the period January 2008 to June 2009. The evaluation covered the two first 
phases of the Action Plan’s implementation 2004-2005 and 2006-2007.  
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lifts, public procurement, and electronic communications networks and services.
60
 A proposal 
for a new non-discrimination directive to tackle discrimination outside the labour market is 
also under discussion, but its approval and entry into force should not be expected too soon.
61
 
As mentioned in the introduction, none of these legislative instruments contain a definition of 
disability.  
The European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 (the ‘EDS 2010-2020’ or simply the 
‘Strategy’),62 which proposes comprehensive and mainstream policy action, complements the 
legal framework in force. While the previous policy programmes had (mainly, whilst not 
exclusively) a strong focus on employment and accessibility in relation to transportation and 
the built environment, the Strategy adopts a wider approach and is articulated in eight 
interconnected key areas of action: accessibility, participation, equality, employment, 
education and training, social protection, health and external action. The strategy firmly 
embraces the social model and explicitly refers to the (non)definition of the UNCRPD 
Convention, according to which ‘people with disabilities include those who have long-term 
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others’. In fact, the whole content and structure of the Strategy have been deeply influenced 
by the UNCRPD, which the EU signed in 2007 and ratified in 2010.
63
  
The UNCRPD is currently an ‘integral part of EU Law’ and enjoys a quasi-
constitutional status in the EU legal system, beneath the Treaties but above secondary law.
64
 
As a consequence, EU secondary law must be interpreted in light of the UNCRPD: if the 
wording of secondary EU legislation is open to more than one interpretation, preference 
should be given, as far as possible, to the interpretation which renders the European provision 
consistent with the Convention. The Court recognises the existence of this duty of consistent 
interpretation, by virtue of the ‘sub-constitutional’ rank of international agreements in the EU 
legal framework. More generally, the UNCRPD has become the benchmark against which 
EU disability initiatives must be measured. Put roughly, the EU must implement the 
Convention and put its provisions into effect within the sphere of its own competence.
65
  
                                                          
60
 See supra Introduction. 
61
 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, COM (2008) 426 def. 
62
 European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, COM(2010) 
636 final.  On the Strategy see inter alia David L. Hosking, ‘Staying the Course: The European Disability 
Strategy 2010–2020’ (2013) 4 European Yearbook of Disability Law,  73; Delia Ferri, ‘Is there a ‘Cultural 
Dimension’ of EU Disability Policy? New Perspectives after the Accession to the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities’ in Lauso Zagato, Dino Costantini, Fabio Perocco (eds), Trasformazioni e Crisi 
della Cittadinanza Sociale (Venice University Press 2014). 
63
 In March 2007, the Council authorized the Commission to sign the Convention and issued a declaration on the 
Optional Protocol and concluded it through Council Decision 2010/48/EC [2010] OJ L 23/35. This concluding 
decision was formally adopted on 26 November 2009, under the EC Treaty. The procedure of ratification was 
completed when the EU officially deposited the instrument of ratification on December 23, 2010. Grainne De 
Burca, ‘The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’ (n 40). 
64
 Ex multis, Etang de Berre, Case C-239/03, [2004 ] E.C.R. I-07357  [25] 
65
 Amongst others, Lisa Waddington, ‘Breaking New Ground: The Implications of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the European Community” in Oddný Mjöll Arnardottir and Gerard Quinn 
(eds), The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives, 
(Brill 2009); Lisa Waddington, ‘The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared Competences’ (2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of 
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4. IN SEARCH FOR A DEFINITION OF DISABILITY AS A GROUND OF DISCRIMINATION: THE ROLE 
OF THE CJEU  
 
4.1. THE CASE LAW BEFORE THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNCRPD… 
 
Until the ratification of the UNCRPD, the development of a social model oriented EU 
disability policy did not provide great clarity on how disability should be defined in EU level. 
The European Commission itself, ambiguously, admitted that ‘the social model of disability 
does not give straightforward insights into how definitions in social policy should be 
formulated’.66 The quest for a definition of disability emerged visibly in the non-
discrimination field, in particular in relation to ‘Employment Equality Directive’,67 in order to 
determine its actual scope ratione personae. The Court of Justice itself has clearly stated that 
the concept of ‘disability’ must be ‘given an autonomous and uniform interpretation’ and that 
is not possible to refer to the laws of the Member States for the definition of that concept.
68
  
The European judges were called on for the first time to define disability in 2005, in 
Chacón Navas.
69
 The facts referred to a Spanish employee who, after being off work sick for 
eight months, was dismissed. While the employer acknowledged that the dismissal was 
‘unlawful’ under Spanish law and offered her compensation, the employee argued that the 
dismissal was ‘void’ due to the unequal treatment and discrimination she suffered, and 
claimed that she should be reinstated in her post. The Spanish court decided to stay the 
proceeding and requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. The core question was to 
establish if the claimant’s health condition fell within the scope of disability according to the 
Employment Equality Directive. According to the national court, even though disability and 
sickness are two different concepts under EU law, there is a causal link between sickness and 
disability. The referring court suggested ‘that sickness constitutes an identifying attribute that 
is not specifically cited which should be added to the ones in relation to which Directive 
2000/78 prohibits discrimination’.70 The Spanish court arrived at that conclusion by referring 
to the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF), according to 
which ‘disability’ is a generic term which includes defects, limitation of activity and 
restriction of participation in social life’, and concluded that ‘sickness is capable of causing 
defects which disable individuals’.71  
In order to reply to the question referred, the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of 
disability, based on the medical model,
72
 and consequently clearly distinguished the concept 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
European and Comparative Law 4, 431.  
66
 Deborah Mabbett, ‘Definitions of Disability in Europe’, (n 20). 
67
 [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
68
 Para. 40 
69
 Case C-13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR I-6467. 
70
 Para. 24. 
71
 Para. 22. 
72
 Lisa Waddington, ‘Equal to the Task? Re-Examining EU Equality Law in Light of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2013) 4 European Yearbook of Disability Law, 169. 
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of sickness from that of disability:
73
 ‘the concept of ‘disability’ must be understood as 
referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological 
impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional 
life’.74 As noted by Waddington, according to the CJEU, the cause of the disadvantage is the 
individual ‘impairment’, irrespective of the role played by environmental barriers. 
Furthermore, differentiating the facts of the case from Mangold,
75
 the Court gave a very 
narrow interpretation of the scope of the Directive.
76
 It clarified that, although fundamental 
rights form an integral part of the general principles of EU law, and include a general 
principle of non-discrimination, ‘it does not follow from this that the scope of Directive 
2000/78 should be extended by analogy beyond the discrimination based on the grounds 
listed exhaustively in Article 1 thereof’.77  
Following the Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Geelhoeld,
78
 the CJEU affirmed that 
the wording of both the Treaty and the directive demonstrated that the EU legislators, by 
selecting the word ‘disability’, must be taken to have intended that ‘sickness’ has a different 
meaning.
79
 Ultimately, the Court argued that there is nothing in the Employment Equality 
Directive to suggest that workers who develop any type of sickness will fall within the 
purview of the protections granted to those discriminated against based on a personal 
disability.
80
  
According to Flynn and Quinn, the formal legal arguments employed by the Court 
obscure other objectives that it has pursued in its judgment. These authors suggest that the 
Court opted for a definition of disability that inflicts the lowest financial burden on Member 
States in effecting that same definition. It seems quite likely that ‘the issue of costs (and the 
need not to unduly intrude on the prerogatives of Member States) played a role in 
determining the boundaries of the definition of disability’.81  
A second relevant case is Coleman.
82
 In this decision, the Court did not expressly 
                                                          
73
 Lisa Waddington, ‘Case C-13/05, Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA, judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of 11 July 2006’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 2, 487. 
74
 Para. 43. 
75
 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, SA [2005] ECR I—9981. 
76
 See also  E. Adobati, ‘ La Corte di giustizia precisa la nozione di handicap ai sensi della direttiva n. 
2000/78/CE’, (2006) Diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali, 531; Francesca Evangelista, ‘Malattia e 
Handicap, Distinte le Tutele Ue’ (2006) 34 Diritto e giustizia, 100; Gaia Giappichelli, ‘La Corte di Giustizia si 
Pronuncia sulla Nozione di Handicap: un Freno alla Vis espansiva del Diritto Antidiscriminatorio?’ (2007) 4  
Riv. it. dir. lav., 758. 
77
 Para. 56, Case C-13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR. I-6467. 
78
 The Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Geelhoeld provided a lengthy and detailed interpretation of former 
Article 13 EC (i.e. Article 19 TFEU) in connection with the Employment Equality Directive. The AG, referring 
to the evolution and wording of former Article 13 EC, mentioned that the list of prohibited grounds for 
discrimination is exhaustive and the scope of the directive need to be interpreted strictly. According to the AG, 
the Court is bound to respect the choices made by the EU legislature ‘with regard to the definition of the 
prohibition of discrimination and the substantive and personal delineation of that prohibition and must not 
stretch them’.  
79
 Para. 44, Case C-13/05, Sonia Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR. I-6467. 
80
 Further to the intersection between the concepts of disability and sickness in the CJEU case law from the EU 
Employment Law perspective, see Mark Bell, Sickness Absence and the Court of Justice: Examining the Role 
of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment Law. (2015) European Law Journal. doi: 10.1111/eulj.12143 
81
 Gerard Quinn and Eilionoir Flynn, ‘Transatlantic Borrowings: The Past and Future of EU Non Discrimination 
Law and Policy on the Ground of Disability’ (n 51). 
82
 Case C- 303/06, S. Coleman v Attridge Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-5603. 
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discuss the precedent established in Chacon Navas, nor addressed explicitly the normative 
definition of disability. It instead substantially broadened the scope ratione personae of the 
Directive,
83
 by admitting discrimination by association. However, in rendering its decision, 
the Court again recalled the Chacon Navas strict definition of disability.
84
  
The reference to the CJEU was made in the course of proceedings between Ms 
Coleman and Attridge Law, a firm of solicitors. Ms Coleman claimed she had been dismissed 
from her employment and treated less favourably than her fellow employees due to her 
ancillary role as a primary care-giver for her disabled son. The referring court asked, in 
essence, whether the Employment Equality Directive must be interpreted as prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of disability only in respect of an employee who is himself 
disabled, or whether the Directive protect also employees who, though they are not 
themselves disabled, are treated less favourably or harassed on the ground of their association 
with a person who is disabled. In answering the questions raised by the referring court, the 
CJEU first recalled that the concept of ‘disability’ was discussed in Chacón Navas (and 
implicitly stated that there was no need to return on the point). There, the CJEU affirmed that 
although ‘the scope of Directive 2000/78 cannot be extended beyond the discrimination based 
on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 of the directive, with the result that a person 
who has been dismissed by his employer solely on account of sickness cannot fall within the 
scope of the general framework established by Directive 2000/78, it nevertheless did not hold 
that the principle of equal treatment and the scope ratione personae of that directive must be 
interpreted strictly with regard to those grounds’. Consequently, the Court, in Coleman, 
affirmed that the objectives of the Directive and its effectiveness would be undermined if an 
employee in the situation of Ms Coleman could not rely on the prohibition of direct 
discrimination laid down in the Directive where it is proven that she has been treated less 
favourably than another employee in a comparable situation on the grounds of her child’s 
disability. 
 
4.2. …AND AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNCRPD. 
 
Chacón Navas was heavily criticized by legal scholarship,
85
 because of the outdated 
medical model approach adopted by the Court, in stark contrast with the orientation taken by 
the EU in its policy documents since the 1996.  
Despite the criticism, the narrow, medical model-oriented concept of disability 
elaborated in Chacón Navas remained the sole prescriptive definition of disability until 2013, 
                                                          
83
 Lisa Waddington, ‘Case C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law, Judgment of the Grand 
Chamber of the Court of Justice of 17 July 2008’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 2, 665. With reference 
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85
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European Public Law, Vol. 22 (3), forthcoming 2016 
 
15 
 
when the Court released its decision in the Ring and Werge case.
86
 For the first time, the 
CJEU openly embraced the social model of disability.
87
 This overruling occurred, mainly, as 
a consequence of the ratification of the UNCRPD: as the Court itself later acknowledged, the 
judgment in Ring and Werge ‘arguably marks a paradigm shift in the Court’s case-law. In 
that case, the EU concept of disability was explicitly aligned with that of the UN 
Convention’.88  
The facts of the joined cases referred to Ms Jette Ring and Ms Lone Skouboe Werge, 
who were both dismissed after several absences from work caused by their health conditions. 
The trade union HK, acting on behalf of the two applicants, submitted that both employees 
were suffering from a disability and that their employers were required to offer them reduced 
working hours, by virtue of the obligation to provide accommodation pursuant to Article 5 of 
Employment Equality Directive. In both main proceedings the employers disputed that the 
applicants’ state of health was covered by the concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of 
the directive. The referring courts thus asked the CJEU if and when a condition caused by a 
medically diagnosed illness could be covered by the ground of disability. In its preliminary 
observations,
89
 the Court articulated that the Employment Equality Directive must, as far as 
practicable, be interpreted in a manner consistent with the UNCRPD, which, like all 
international treaties concluded by the EU, becomes an integral part of EU law and enjoys, as 
recalled above in Section 3, a sub constitutional status. The Court considered in particular the 
wording of recital (e) and article 1, paragraph 2 of the Convention, subsequently outlining a 
definition of disability based on the social model and consistent with the Convention. It 
finally recognised that ‘sickness can, in some circumstances, constitute a disability’ for the 
purpose of the directive: ‘if a curable or incurable illness entails a limitation which results in 
particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with 
various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in 
professional life on an equal basis with other workers, and the limitation is a long-term one, 
such an illness can be covered by the concept of ‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 
2000/78.’90  
The CJEU affirmed that the scope of the Directive is not limited to disabilities that are 
congenital or resulting from accidents. In this respect, the Court distinguished between short-
term illnesses, which are not to be regarded as a disability, and long-term impairments which 
can be caused by sickness and which, when subject to various barriers and exogenous factors, 
can be regarded as disabilities.
91
  
                                                          
86
 Joined cases C- 335/11 and C- 337/11, HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v Dansk almennyttigt 
Boligselskab (C-335/11) and HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Lone Skouboe Werge v Dansk 
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After Ring and Werge, in Commission v Italy,
92
 the CJEU confirmed that, while it is 
true that the concept of a ‘disability’ is not directly defined in the Employment Equality 
Directive, it should be interpreted on the basis of the UNCRPD.
93
 That case originated from 
action for failure to fulfil EU obligations brought by the Commission against Italy. The 
Commission affirmed that Italy did not correctly transpose the Employment Equality 
Directive into its national law, and, in particular, it did not ensure, in breach of Article 5 of 
the Directive, that reasonable accommodation in the workplace is to apply to all persons with 
disabilities, all employers, and all aspects of the employment relationship. The Court stated 
that the definition of disability adopted by Italian legislation
94
 was too narrow, and had failed 
to include all persons with disabilities.
95
 Italy based its defence on the Chacón Navas case’s 
outdated concept of disability,
96
 and argued that neither the Commission nor the Employment 
Equality Directive specified a uniform concept of disability, to which all Member States 
should conform. Italy attempted to claim also that the CJEU had not provided a concrete and 
specific definition of disability. According to the Italian government, the generic definition of 
disability adopted in Chacón Navas afforded to Member States a broad discretion in 
transposing the concept at national level. The CJEU however rejected Italian arguments, 
recalled Ring and Werge’s definition and finally condemned Italy.  
Similarly, in Z. v A Government Department and the Board of management of a 
community school,
97
 the Court 
98
 referred to the UNCRPD’s (non)definition of disability 99 
and again firmly embraced the social model of disability. However, the definition that the 
court adopted was somewhat narrower than that embraced in the previous cases. In this case, 
Ms Z., employed as a post primary school teacher in a school managed by the Board of 
Management, opted for surrogacy due to a rare health condition affecting her and causing her 
infertility. During the surrogate’s pregnancy, Ms Z made an application for adoption leave. 
After having been refused paid leave of absence, Ms Z brought a complaint before the Irish 
Equality Tribunal. She argued that she had been subject to discrimination on grounds of sex, 
family status and disability. The Equality Tribunal decided to stay the proceedings and to 
refer for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. Inter alia the Tribunal asked whether Articles 3(1) 
and 5 of the Employment Equality Directive are ‘to be interpreted as meaning that there is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Disability’ (2013) 4 European Labour Law Journal 2, 2013,135. 
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discrimination on the ground of disability where a woman – who suffers from a disability 
which prevents her from giving birth, whose genetic child has been born through a surrogacy 
arrangement, and who is responsible for the care of her genetic child from birth – is refused 
paid leave from employment equivalent to maternity leave and/or adoption leave’. In order to 
reply the question referred, the Court recalled Ring and Werge and the UNCRPD, confirming 
that the concept of disability refers to a limitation which results in particular from long-term 
physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an 
equal basis with other workers.
100
 However, in this case, the Court made a clearer and sharper 
distinction between the (non)definition of the UNCRPD and the one adopted in the EU legal 
framework: ‘[w]hereas the UN Convention refers broadly to participation in society, the 
Court’s definition covers only participation in professional life’. The Court relied on the 
limited scope of the directive ratione materiae, as the directive only targets disabilities that 
make a worker’s involvement in professional life more burdensome. In doing so, it also 
explicitly narrowed down the definition of disability. The Court concluded that ‘the inability 
to have a child by conventional means does not in itself, in principle, prevent the 
commissioning mother from having access to, participating in or advancing in 
employment’.101 In other words, although the claimant’s infertility would be categorized as a 
disability under the UNCRPD, it was not under the Employment Equality Directive, because 
of the Directive’s limited scope. This decision makes plain a sort of imperfect fit between the 
UNCRPD broad definition of disability and the scope of the Employment Equality Directive, 
which only applies to employment-related issues.
102
 However, the Court clarified that the 
emerging difference in results between the Employment Equality Directive’s and the 
UNCRPD’s notions of disability did not affect the validity of that directive in the light of the 
UN Convention
103
.  
In Kaltoft 
104
 the Court was asked to investigate the relationship between disability and 
obesity.
105
 The facts referred to the dismissal of Mr Karsten Kaltoft, who worked for 15 years 
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for the Municipality of Billund (Denmark) as a childminder. During his employment, 
consequent to his recognised obesity, Kaltoft was provided financial assistance to fund fitness 
and physical training sessions as part of the local authority's health policy, but without 
successful results. Although the employer rejected the contention that Mr Kaltoft’s obesity 
formed part of the reasons behind his dismissal, the Fag og Arbejde, a workers’ union acting 
on behalf of Mr Kaltoft, brought proceedings founded upon unlawful discrimination on 
grounds of disability. The claimant argued in his written observations that the WHO 
considers obesity to be a chronic and durable illness.
106
 Furthermore, he pointed out that 
obesity has been considered to be a disability under US law. Obesity can, in fact, entail 
physical limitations that create obstacles to the full and effective participation in professional 
life, either because of reduced mobility or because of pathologies or symptoms that result 
from it, and it can equally entail limitations on the employment market by reason of prejudice 
on the basis of physical appearance.
107
 In these circumstances, the referring court asked the 
CJEU if obesity could be deemed to be a disability within the meaning of the Employment 
Equality Directive.
108
 Both the Opinion of the AG and the judgment of the Court recognized 
that, even if obesity does not in itself constitute a disability within the meaning of Directive 
2000/78/EC ‘in the event that, under given circumstances, the obesity of the worker 
concerned entails a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or 
psychological impairments that in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and 
effective participation of that person in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, 
and the limitation is a long-term one, obesity can be covered by the concept of ‘disability’ 
within the meaning of Directive 2000/78’.109 
However, the CJEU took a cautious approach and left it to the national court to decide 
whether in the pending case obesity constituted a disability.
110
 The Court demonstrated a 
particular reticence in addressing such a topical issue, acknowledging that the implications of 
recognising obesity as a disability could have a large impact on the labour market and, 
recalling Flynn and Quinn’s arguments, on the costs to be borne by the Member States, 
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especially those where obesity is an increasing phenomenon.
111
 
All in all, it appears that the ratification of the UNCRPD has led to a clear departure in 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice: the (non)definition provided by the UNCRPD 
represents a landmark for the CJEU. However, the CJEU has taken a somewhat ambiguous 
path. On the one hand, as it appears in Ring and Werge and in Kaltoft, disability is used as an 
‘umbrella-term’, encompassing a large variety of different health situations. This has 
inevitably had the result of implicitly enlarging the scope of the Employment Equality 
Directive ratione personae. On the other hand, the restricted scope ratione materiae of the 
directive falls short of the wide social-model oriented notion of disability purported by the 
UNCRPD. Thus, the Court inevitably narrows down the definition of disability to make it fit 
within the scope of the directive, as it appears in Z. v A Government Department. 
 
4.3. GLAZEL AND THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY OUTSIDE THE EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY 
DIRECTIVE: SHADING AWAY FROM THE SOCIAL MODEL? 
 
In Glatzel,
112
 the Court examined the definition of disability in relation to Article 21 EU 
CFR, outside the employment context. However, again, interestingly enough it chooses a 
very ambiguous path.  
Mr Glatzel lost his driving licence in April 2010, on the ground that he had driven 
under the influence of alcohol. He then applied for a new driving licence. While he was 
granted  a licence to drive certain ‘light’ motor vehicle heavy, he was refused the 
authorization to conduct heavy good vehicles on the ground that an ophthalmological 
examination had revealed that Mr Glatzel suffered from unilateral amblyopia, involving a 
substantial functional loss of vision in only one eye. However, the visual acuity in Mr 
Glatzel’s right eye did not satisfy the requirements laid down in Annex III to Directive 
2006/126/EC, according to which drivers of these types of vehicles must have visual acuity 
of at least 0,1. This provision is not based on the idea of addressing the lack of spatial vision 
of the person concerned but to enable the driver of a motor vehicle in one of those categories 
to react to a sudden loss of vision in the better eye during a journey and to stop the vehicle on 
the side of the road using his residual vision.  
Following an unsuccessful challenge to that decision, Mr Glatzel brought an action 
before the Administrative Court of Regensburg. Since that court dismissed his action, Mr 
Glatzel brought an appeal against that judgment before the Bayerischer 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof. The latter court stated that Mr Glatzel, who had a normal field of 
vision and whose visual impairments affected, in particular, his central visual acuity, would 
be capable of seeing objects appearing in his field of peripheral vision in essentially the same 
way as a person with normal vision and would, therefore, be able to stop the power-driven 
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vehicle he was driving even by using only his residual vision. The court, thus, decided to stay 
the proceedings and to refer the CJEU for a preliminary ruling and asked whether the strict 
requirements laid down in Annex III to Directive 2006/126/EC constituted an interference 
with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 20, 21(1) and 26 of the EU CFR, which 
concern equality before the law, non-discrimination on grounds of disability and the 
integration of persons with disabilities.   
The Court, in answering the question, first highlighted that the notion of ‘disability’ is 
not defined by the Charter itself.  Then, it referred to its case-law on equal treatment in the 
area of employment and occupation, namely Ring and Werge and Commission v Italy, and 
stated that: ‘Article 21(1) of the Charter requires the EU legislature, in particular, not to apply 
any difference in treatment on the basis of a limitation resulting, in particular, from long-term 
physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an 
equal basis with other persons, unless such a difference in treatment is objectively 
justified’.113 
On the one hand, the European judges recalled the previous case law. On the other 
hand, the Court stated that it did not have sufficient information to ascertain whether Mr 
Glatzel’s impairment constituted a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the Charter, thus 
substantially refusing to ‘apply’ the definition. In addition, the Court added that it was not 
really necessary for the purpose of determining the validity of Directive 2006/126/EC, in the 
light of Article 21(1) of the Charter, to determine definitively whether, in the case in the main 
proceedings, Mr Glatzel was disabled. Even if the state of a person like Mr Glatzel could be 
considered as falling within the definition of ‘disability’ within the meaning of the Charter, 
the difference in treatment consisting in not issuing him with a driving licence for certain 
vehicles may be objectively justified in the light of overriding considerations of road safety. 
The Court went on to refer to the requirements laid down in Annex II to the Directive 
2006/126/EC and the determination of minimum value relating to visual acuity required to 
certain vehicles. The Court plainly referred to medical data, and recalled that the EU 
legislature has a broad discretion in relation to complex medical questions, such as those 
relating to the visual acuity necessary to drive power-driven vehicles. In such a context, the 
Court claimed that it could not carry out an assessment of scientific and technical facts, which 
is a task for the legislature. Without discussing the findings of the Court in detail, it is notable 
that, as highlighted by O’Brien,114 the Court clearly ‘adopted the language of the social model 
of disability, but has so far failed to apply it’. As this Author suggests, the Court considers 
that disability is to be found nowhere other than in the impairment itself, and actually focused 
on the nature of the impairment. This is probably a bold statement, but it is certain that the 
Court has not yet taken a clear approach to disability, and undoubtedly cases like Glatzel and 
Z offer very little (and confused) guidance.   
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5. IS THERE A ROOM FOR A LEGISLATIVE DEFINITION IN THE PROPOSAL FOR A NON-
DISCRIMINATION DIRECTIVE? 
 
Almost 7 years ago, in 2008, the Commission proposed a new Directive extending the 
material scope of the provisions against discrimination on the ground of religion and belief, 
disability, age and sexual orientation beyond the area of employment, in the fields of social 
protection, including social security and healthcare; social advantages; education; access to 
and supply of goods and other services which are available to the public, including 
housing.
115
  The proposed Directive replicates those parts of the material scope of the Race 
Equality Directive
116
 that were not included in the Employment Equality Directive. In other 
words, the proposal, which is built upon the legal basis of Article 19 TFEU, purports to 
implement the principle of equal treatment even in sectors other than employment, 
supplementing the existing legal framework. However, as noted by Howard, the scope is still 
narrower than that of the Race Directive, as Article 3 of the Proposal contains more 
exceptions.
117
 Waddington, in her analysis of the proposal, underlines that many Member 
States are still querying the extent of the EU’s power to legislate in areas such as health and 
social protection, thus undermining the prospects of broad and progressive reform in this 
area.
118
 
Without addressing the proposal in detail, for the purposes of this article it suffices to 
point out that the proposed Directive shows a more ambitious approach with regard to the 
prohibition of disability discrimination, and includes a number of additional provisions to 
strengthen disability discrimination law. However, there is a very evident restraint with 
regards to defining disability.   
Notably, the original text of the proposal, though containing reference to the UNCRPD, 
did not include an explicit definition of disability. In this respect, as noted by Bell,
119
 ‘the 
proposed Directive could be regarded as a missed opportunity’. However, in its ‘Legislative 
Resolution to the Proposal’,120 the European Parliament proposed inserting a definition of 
disability drawn from the UNCRPD, but in the Preamble rather than in a specific article. In 
particular, in an amendment to Recital 12(a) of the Directive, Article 1 UNCRPD was 
included in the non-binding preamble: ‘Persons with disabilities include those who have 
long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which, in interaction with 
various barriers, whether environmental or attitudinal, may hinder their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others.’ 
The inclusion of this preambular paragraph in the proposed Directive, if adopted, 
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should provide some further guidance on the concept of disability to both Member States and 
the CJEU. However, it is far from constituting a real innovation. It will perpetuate a situation 
in which there is no prescriptive definition in the European legal framework. In addition, this 
amendment would have been significant at the time of its release, i.e. before the adoption of 
the UNCRPD, as a means of adapting EU law to the Convention’s text. However, now, that 
the UNCRPD is an integral part of EU law and is constantly referred to by the CJEU, the 
abovementioned recital will not have an actual impact. Probably, rebus sic stantibus, the 
addition of such a text in the preamble of the proposed Directive would possibly even be 
useless and redundant.  
The Parliament, however, suggested another interesting amendment to article 4 of the 
proposed directive including, beside persons with disabilities, ‘persons with chronic 
diseases’. This amendment suggests that persons with chronic diseases are not (necessarily) 
to be considered persons with disabilities, but they must be protected against discrimination. 
This amendment, if agreed, would add petrol to the fire of the already discussed distinction 
between sickness and disability. The Parliament also suggested adding an alinea in the same 
article stating that the concept of disability is to be understood in the light of the UNCRPD 
(Article 4(1)). Again this reference to the Convention and to the need for consistent 
interpretation is arguably redundant, since the principle is well established and already 
applied by the CJEU in a regular manner (at least formally).   
At present, this proposed Directive is still subject to an ongoing discussion and 
negotiation in Council. As yet, it has not been possible to achieve the unanimous agreement 
of all Member States that is required for the adoption of directives based on Article 19 
TFEU.
121
 It appears that the EU legislature is not ready to engage with a legislative 
definition, and prefers either no definition or an indirect (and blurred) definition by mere 
reference to the Convention.  
  
6. IS IT TIME TO TAKE STOCK? 
 
Recalling Degener’s words,122 ‘legal definitions of disability have been [and continue 
to be] an issue of much debate in Europe and around the globe’. In the EU, the quest for a 
definition of disability has emerged prominently and has not yet found a solution, in 
particular with regards to the non-discrimination field.  
Absent an explicit definition, the CJEU has been called to fill the gap. The Court did 
not shrink from this task but first adopted a conservative medical model-oriented attitude, and 
then, even when overruling its case law, it still ‘walked on the edge’. It formally and firmly 
embraced the social model, but, in particular in Z and Glatzel, substantially distanced itself 
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from the social model-oriented conceptualization, narrowing down the concept of disability 
and still focusing on the impairment.   
The absence of a definition in the EU non-discrimination legislation has given to the 
Court great flexibility, and the possibility of adaptation. Disability is an evolving concept, as 
stated in the UNCRPD’s Preamble.123 However, the undeniable judicial activism of the 
Court, so far, has not brought great clarity. In addition, the constant reference to Article 1 
UNCRPD and to the social model has offered little legal certainty in respect of what 
constitutes a disability for the purpose of EU non-discrimination law.  It is probably true to 
say that a clear-cut legislative definition could impact negatively on the protection of persons 
of disability, limiting the scope of the legislation provided. However, it would probably be 
desirable to develop consistent public policies and to combat discrimination consistently 
across the EU. As several scholars contend,
124
 the way in which disability is conceived has a 
decisive impact on the enforcement of legislation protecting and promoting the rights of 
persons with disabilities.
125
 As Mabbett 
126
 argues, ‘it may not be possible to promote 
sufficient substantive equality without treating some people differently on grounds of 
disability. If so, it is necessary to have an idea of what constitutes a fair basis for ‘differential 
treatment’. Even those such as Woodhams and Corby,127 who advocate for a radical approach 
that bypasses the requirement for a definition, seem to implicitly recognise that the 
understanding of disability directly affects the way in which people with disabilities are 
regarded and treated by administrations and other societal organisations. Whittle and 
Venchiarutti
128
 observe that variations amongst the Member States in terms of the definition 
of disability would result in a disparate application of the Employment Equality Directive 
throughout the EU, and this, in turn, will have a negative impact on the fundamental principle 
of the free-movement of persons.  
In several circumstances the EU institutions (in particular the Commission) expressed 
their negative view in respect to a prescriptive definition of disability in legislation.
129
 The 
text of the 2008 Proposal for a New Equal Treatment Directive is the most recent (and 
probably not the last) evidence of this negative attitude. Even though the proposal is not 
likely to be approved soon, and the current text will be probably subject to modifications and 
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amendments, the legislative ‘restraint’ shown up to now is not likely to change.  
 
 
